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This paper discusses the way in which the existence of debt denominated in both 
domestic and foreign currency affects debt-sustainability analyses. Ignoring valuation 
issues can lead to misleading conclusions regarding fiscal sustainability. We show that a 
devaluation of the domestic currency can significantly change the path of a sustainable 
fiscal policy. In our model, the adjustment not only comes through the change in the 
value of the foreign currency-denominated public debt, but also though the effects on the 
interest rate and growth. We find that the required fiscal adjustment to achieve fiscal 
sustainability after a devaluation increases with the size of the devaluation, the length of 
the adjustment period, the effect on interest rates and growth, and the share of public debt 
that is denominated in foreign currency. 
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  This paper discusses the way in which the existence of debt denominated in both 
domestic and foreign currency affects debt-sustainability analyses. We show that a 
devaluation of the domestic currency can significantly change the path of a sustainable 
fiscal policy. 
  This is important, for instance, to poor countries. Most of the public debt of these 
countries is dollar-denominated. A devaluation not only increases the debt ratios.  It will 
most likely also affect the interest rate that the country can negotiate on international 
markets, hence increasing the debt burden. It will likely also have effects on growth in the 
short term, which can also affect the sustainable fiscal path. 
  Policy decisions must take this factor into account because LDCs frequently face 
terms of trade or other shocks that require a real devaluation. A possibility, suggested by 
Hausmann (2003),
1 would be to issue domestic currency-denominated debt. But it is well 
known that this is a limited possibility for many developing countries as the domestic 
financial system is not well developed. In several cases, it is not a matter of insufficient 
domestic savings but rather a history of expropriations (either directly or by unexpected 
high inflation). This translates into a high cost of domestic public debt.
2 
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we motivate the issue by 
discussing the concept of sustainability, the policy debate on this subject, and by 
reviewing the recent literature. In section 3, we present the sustainability model, which 
differs from early literature by including the valuation effects. In section 4, we estimate 
the key parameters of the model. With this estimation and other assumptions that are 
common to developing countries,
3 we perform, in Section 5, some simulations to 
determine the sustainable path of the fiscal balance after a significant devaluation of the 
domestic currency. We find that the effects on this sustainable path can be quite 
significant. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                            
1 See also Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003). 
2 This assumes that expropriations are more likely to occur with domestic rather than with foreign debt. 
3 See Edwards and Vergara (op.cit.) for a detailed discussion of some of these parameters.   2 
2. Fiscal sustainability and valuation problems: a discussion 
An economy is said to have achieved fiscal sustainability when the ratio of public 
sector debt to GDP is stationary, and consistent with the overall demand–both domestic 
and foreign–for government securities.
4  An important by-product of public sector 
sustainability analyses is the computation of the public sector’s primary balance 
compatible with a sustainable and stable debt to GDP ratio.
5  This “sustainable primary 
balance” has become an increasingly important variable in macroeconomic analyses and 
is now routinely included as a disbursement condition in IMF programs.  The World 
Bank and the IMF have analyzed the external debt sustainability issue using a “present 
value constraint” approach.
6   This approach consists of analyzing whether, once debt is 
forgiven (for instance for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries), the net present value of the 
country’s external debt stabilizes at its “steady state” level relative to GDP.
7  A 
characteristic of the World Bank-IMF approach is that it implicitly assumes that if the 
country implements an appropriate set of economic reforms, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
achieved immediately after debt relief will be sustainable in the longer run.  Hence, it 
does not consider possible valuation problems in the future. This paper goes further than 
previous work by the authors and explicitly discusses the way in which real exchange rate 
changes, more specifically, real exchange rate devaluations, affect fiscal sustainability. 
This paper is also related to recent literature that emphasizes the problems for 
macroeconomic policy in emerging economies derived from large currency mismatches. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) refer to the situation in which countries cannot use 
the domestic currency to borrow abroad as the “original sin” since it implies that the 
country becomes extremely vulnerable to any shock that causes a change in the real 
exchange rate. 
Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) consider the effects of a real 50% depreciation 
of the domestic currency on fiscal sustainability in different Latin American countries, 
assuming that interest rates and GDP growth remain unchanged. For the case of 
Argentina, these authors find that the 50% depreciation requires an adjustment of 0.7% to 
                                                            
4 Naturally, the debt ratio may be calculated relative to alternative benchmarks.  On sustainability analyses 
see, for example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1996, 2000) and Edwards (2002). 
5   The primary balance is defined as the nominal balance, excluding interest payments. 
6   See, for example, World Bank and IMF (2002), Lachler ( 2001). 
7   See Cuddington (1995).   3 
the GDP in the primary balance so as to keep the ratio of debt to GDP constant. In our 
analysis, we assume that both interest rates and GDP are affected, at least in the short run, 
and we also introduce dynamic aspects, such as countries having some time to adjust to 
their sustainable debt level after the devaluation. 
Calvo and Reinhardt (2002) argue that devaluations are more contractionary in 
developing countries than in industrial countries. The basic explanation is that the former 
have larger currency mismatches than the latter. These currency mismatches give rise to 
what they call the “fear of floating.” Hausmann et al. (2001) argue that the greater the 
dependence on foreign currency borrowing, the greater the “fear of floating” on the part 
of developing economies. They show that the currency mismatches explain the cross-
country differences in the fear of floating better than the cross-country differences in the 
pass-through coefficient.  
 
3. The model 
 
  Total public debt (measured in domestic currency) is calculated as: 
 
(1)  Dt = P t + e t F t 
 
Dt is total debt, Pt is domestic currency-denominated debt, Ft is dollar-denominated debt, 
and et is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per dollar).  Subscript t denotes 
time. 
  We assume that this country starts from a position of fiscal sustainability
8 in the 
sense that its total public debt as a ratio of GDP (Dt/Yt) is consistent with the demand for 
government debt. 
 
From (1) it follows that, 
 
(2)  D t = { P t + e t   F t } + F t  e t 
 
                                                            
8 For instance, a HIPC country after the completion point.   4 
The first term on the right-hand side { P t + e t   F t } represents new debt being issued, 
and in that regard, it captures “fresh” resources.  The second term {Ft  et} is the 
valuation effect.  Equation (2) clearly shows that the total debt measured in domestic 
currency can increase for two reasons: new debt may be issued or the local currency-
value of the old debt may increase due to a nominal devaluation.  Naturally, there may be 
a combination of these two factors. 
  According to the public sector budget constraint, net new debt issued- in domestic 
and foreign currency--has to be equal to the gap between expenditures and revenues.  
Expenditures can be broken down in two components: primary expenditures and interest 
payments.  Revenues, in turn, are equal to seigniorage (St) and other revenues.  Thus, the 
public sector budget constraint may be written as follows (where  Dt
N is new debt issued 
and corresponds to the term { Pt + et  Ft} in equation (2)): 
 
(3)   
 
where pbt is the primary balance, defined as non-seigniorage revenues minus primary 
expenditures, it is the interest rate on domestic currency-denominated debt, and  is the 
interest rate on foreign currency-denominated debt. 
  A key variable in any sustainability analysis is the evolution of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio over time.  To the extent that both variables–debt and GDP–are measured in the 
same currency, tracing the evolution of the ratio is easy.  Things are a bit more 
complicated when the two variables in the ratio are denominated in different currencies 
or, more specifically, when part of the debt is denominated in foreign currency.   
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Where both variables are measured in current local currency and Dt comes from equation 
(1).  
It follows from (4), (1) and (2) and after some math that:   5 
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Where gt is real GDP growth and  t is the domestic rate of inflation. If there is no foreign 
currency-denominated debt, then Ft = 0 and (5) collapses to the familiar expression for 
public sector debt sustainability.
9   
If, however, some public sector debt is denominated in foreign currency, the 
traditional analysis will be misleading.  In this case, using equation (3) on the public 
sector budget constraint and some algebra, we obtain the expression for the primary 
balance consistent with a steady-state fiscal sustainability (i.e. Δδt = 0): 
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9 In a steady state, where Δδt = 0, then ΔPt/Pt = ΔDt/Dt = gt + πt,  or ΔDt/Yt = Dt/Yt (gt + πt). This implies 
that to maintain the ratio of public debt to GDP constant, the budget deficit has to be equal to the debt-to-
GDP ratio times the nominal GDP growth rate.   6 
In deriving this expression, we have also used the fact that the nominal GDP growth rate 
is equal to real growth (gt) and inflation (πt). rt is the real interest rate on domestic 
currency-denominated debt and rt
FC the real interest rate on foreign currency-denominated 
debt.  The last term on the right-hand side is the “correction factor” that arises from the 
existence of foreign currency-denominated debt. RERt is the real exchange rate and the 
hat stands for the percentage change.  
  Notice that ignoring this “correction factor” will result in a miscalculation of the 
primary deficit consistent with a stable debt-to-GDP ratio.  In particular, if the country 
experiences a real devaluation–that is, if ( RERt/RERt) > 0–, ignoring the “correction 
factor” will result in an underestimation of the primary balance consistent with 
sustainability.  
The case where there is a Balassa-Samuelson effect in which the currency exhibits 
a real appreciation over time can be thought of as leading to a larger sustainable primary 
deficit (see equation 6) since this implies that the value of the foreign debt as a 
percentage of GDP is declining over time due to this effect. This, however, does not 
invalidate our concern regarding the dramatic valuation effects that can take place if there 
is a considerable devaluation. 
  Assuming that δ* is the sustainable public-debt-to-GDP ratio in the sense that it is 
consistent with the demand for that debt, then if δt< δ*, the country will be able to sustain 
smaller primary balances than those of a steady state for a while. In equation (6)  t is 
positive (hence the primary balance smaller) in the sense that the debt to GDP ratio can 
increase and still be consistent with debt sustainability. The inverse occurs if δt > δ*. 
  We assume that the uncovered real interest rate parity holds: 
(7)  t ρ ) RER E( * r r
^
t t t = 
FC
t r  
 
where  t ρ  is the country risk premium and rt* is the (exogenously given) risk-free world 
interest rate. Additionally, we assume that  ) RER E(
^
t = 0.   7 
On the other hand, as in Edwards (1986) and Min (1998), we assume that the 
country risk premium is a function of the level of public debt and a set of economic 
variables ( t X ). The larger the public debt, the higher the risk premium. Hence: 
 
(8)  ) X , ρ(ʴ ρ t t t     with  0 ʴ / ρ t t    
 
We also assume that after a devaluation occurs, the debt holders (actual and 
potential) do not necessarily require the country to return its initial position immediately. 
They understand that there are valuation effects.  Hence, they give some time t  to the 
country to adjust and return to δ*. This time t  will depend on the track record of the 
country and on the credibility of its adjustment program. 
  Let us call the accepted level of public debt (as a ratio of GDP) in the years after a 
devaluation as  t . The behavior of  t is represented by: 
 
(9)    ) 1 )( (
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  Expression (9) tells that as t approaches t , the level of accepted public debt 
approaches the steady-state level δ*. On the one extreme, if the market give the country 
just one period to adjust to δ*, then 
*
t . This means that the primary balance will 
have to increase as much as necessary so that the ratio of public debt to GDP remains 
unchanged at level δ*. On the other extreme, if the market gives the country infinite time   8 
to adjust (t ), then  0 t . This means that the new equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio 
becomes δ0 rather than δ*. 
Finally, we assume that when public debt is above its sustainable level, GDP 
growth is below its potential, the reasons being the higher interest rate discussed above 
and also the increased uncertainty derived form the fact that taxes or seigniorage might be 
increased to finance the larger primary deficit. The larger the gap between sustainable 
and actual debt, the greater the impact on growth. This can be expressed as: 
(11)  g  
) ʴ β(ʴ g t t                      ʴ ʴ if t  
   
where g* is the potential GDP rate of growth.  
 
 
4. Estimations  
  In this section, we are interested in estimating the effect of public debt on the 
interest rate of that debt (equations 7 and 8), the dynamics of the debt when there is a 
shock to the real exchange rate (equation 9 and 10), and the impact of debt on growth 
(equation 11). 
  Our estimations consider five Latin American countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru.
10  We use quarterly data for the period 1999:I – 2007:IV. The variables 
include the country risk as measured by the quarterly average of the EMBI Plus index 
t ρ .
11 The data on external public debt as a percentage of GDP was obtained from the 
World Bank. For the real exchange rate, we use the traditional measure 
                                                            
10 The sample is limited by the availability of country risk data for Latin American countries. 
11 The EMBI Plus measures the interest rate differential between the dollar bonds issued by governments 
and the U.S. Treasury bonds. The source is www.valorfuturo.cl. 
*






RER  9 
where Pt* is the dollar-denominated CPI of the main trading partners, E is the nominal 
exchange rate (local currency per dollar), and P is the domestic CPI. All these data plus 





Public debt and interest rates 
  We now proceed to estimate the effect of a change in public debt on the interest 
rate of that debt. Because there is no total public debt quarterly data available for all 
countries considered, we do our estimations using only foreign public debt.
13 Our 
dependent variable is the risk premium (see equations 7 and 8), that is, we want to 
estimate the effect of a change in the public debt on the risk premium paid on that debt.  
We estimate the following panel: 
 
it i t t i 5 t i 4
t i
3 1 t i 2 1 t i ξ μ λ g ʱ RER ʱ
GDP
EPD
ʱ ρ ʱ ʱ ρ (12)  
 




 is the ratio of public foreign debt to GDP. As we mentioned above, it 
is expected that the greater the public debt, the higher the risk premium. 
-  it RER  is the real exchange rate index. Like in Edwards (1986) and Min (1998), 
we analyze whether a less competitive real exchange rate (appreciation) can 
adversely affect the risk premium. According to Cline (1983), real appreciations 
in LDCs  played a major role in the overborrowing process. 
-  it g  is the rate of growth of GDP. We expect that a higher GDP growth will 
reduce country risk. 
                                                            
12 The unit root tests of our variables reject the null hypothesis that variables are order-1 integrated.  
13 For the five countries considered in this paper, foreign public debt represents about 50% of total public 
debt. For less developed countries, the share of foreign debt is even higher.   10 
-Finally, t λ  is a temporary fixed effect,  i μ is a country-specific fixed effect, it ξ is 
an iid  ) σ (0,
2
ξ  distributed-error term. 
 
  We first estimated equation (12) using a static GLS fixed-effect method. The 
Hausmann test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlations between the fixed effects and 
the explanatory variables, thus validating the estimation through fixed effects. However, 
considering both the dynamic structure of the model and the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables, we proceeded to estimate it by the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
methodology. 
  The results are presented in Table 1. The first regression shows the results of the 
fixed-effect estimation. The effect of the debt on the risk premium (and hence interest 
rate) is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient shows that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio (say from 30% to 31%) produces an increase in 
the interest rate of 18 basis points (say from 5% to 5.18%). Regressions 2-4 show the 
results of the dynamic estimation using the Arellano and Bond methodology. The results 
are consistent with those found in regression 1 in the sense that the coefficient of the debt 
variable is positive and statistically significant and the magnitude of the short-term effect 
is about the same. However we are able, with the dynamic specification, to obtain long-
term effects. Note that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is positive and 
statistically significant, indicating a persistence in the effect on the risk premium. In 
particular, the results show that in the long term, there is an effect of 30 basis points in 
the interest rate as the ratio of public debt to GDP increases by one percentage point.  
  Both the Sargan test and the second-order residual serial correlation tests confirm 












Estimates using Fixed Effects model and Arellano-Bond model 
 
          Dependent Variable: Interest rate spread (ρt)       
    Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4 
              
ρt-1    
-  0.354  0.241  0.282 
      (0.064)***  (0.168)  (0.131)** 
External Public Debt/GDPt     0.183  0.184  0.167  0.167 
      (0.028)***  (0.044)***  (0.028)***  (0.025)*** 
RERt     0.06600  -  0.0420  0.0350 
      (0.009)***  (0.018)**  (0.012)*** 
GDP growth rate t     -0.083  -  -  0.015 
      (0.053)  (0.099) 
Time Effect     YES  YES  YES  YES 
                 
           
R2 within     0.8190  -  -  - 
R2 between     0.8318  -  -  - 
R2 overall     0.7826  -  -  - 
Sargan Test (p-value)     -  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Serial Correlation order 1     -  0.0740  0.1411  0.0508 
Serial Correlation order 2     -  0.2835  0.2343  0.2443 
Observations     155  148  148  148 
Groups     5  5  5  5 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis       




The dynamics of public debt 
  The second step in our analysis is to study the dynamics of public debt when the 
exchange rate changes (equations 9 and 10). To address this issue, we use vector 
autoregressions (VAR) to analyze the dynamic impact on public debt in each country of a 
random disturbance in the real exchange rate.  
Let Xt be the vector of endogenous variables.  It would be written in reduced form 
as follows for the VAR system:   12 
t 1 t t U A(L)X X  
 






The equations include a lag, established using Akaike’s criteria. 
The reduced residuals (Ut) and, more specifically, the residuals of the foreign 
public debt-to-GDP ratio   GDP
EPD
t u  , can also be determined as: (1) a linear combination of 
the response of the foreign public debt-to-GDP ratio when there are unexpected shocks in 
the other variables, (2) the discretionary response of the policy-maker to changes in the 
variables
14 and  (3) the random shocks of foreign debt.
15 
As mentioned earlier, our analysis is concentrated on the response of the foreign 
public debt-to-GDP ratio to an unexpected shock in the real exchange rate.  We are 
specifically looking to estimate the time  (t ) that a certain country takes to adapt to its 
sustainable public debt level.  We therefore estimated the effect of an unexpected shock 
(one-time only) on the RER, assuming that the RER will not react contemporaneously to 
changes in the other model variables and that the other variables (EPD/GDP, ρ, g) do not 
react contemporaneously to shocks in the other variables, except for changes in the RER.  
Moreover, the path of the EPD/GDP is estimated separately from the shocks to the rest of 
the variables (i.e., the only shock that is received throughout the period of analysis is to 
the RER). 
  The results are presented in figure 1, panels A-E. This figure shows the response 
of foreign public debt-to-GDP ratio to a one standard deviation shock in the RER.   The 
results show the responses over a horizon of 25 quarters. The figure shows that the 
                                                            
14 Like in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the discretionary responses are assumed to take more than one 
quarter to appear and, therefore, they do not capture the quarterly data from the series used.  
15 See Perotti (2005) for a more in-depth discussion of this subject. 










t u , u , u , u U
t t  13 
foreign public debt-to-GDP ratio increases and that this effect lasts for approximately 2 to 
3 years in the cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, and 10 years in the case of 
Peru. 
  Hence, for the simulations in our model, we will assume that the time in which the 
country has to return to an acceptable level of public debt (in the sense discussed in the 










Public Debt and Growth 
  Finally, we turn to the question of the effect of public debt on growth (equation 
11). To find the answer, we estimate the following dynamic regression: 
 
 
it i t it it
it
it it r RER
GDP
Debt Public External
g g 5 4 3 1 2 1 ) 12 (  
 
   
  We also use the Arellano and Bond methodology in this estimation since this is a 
dynamic equation and some of the explanatory variables are endogenous. Table 2 
presents the results. The coefficient of public debt is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that growth declines as debt increases. The coefficient indicates that one 
percentage point increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio reduces the growth rate by 0.14 
percentage points in the short term and by about 0.3 percentage points in the long term. 
  The Sargan test and the second-order residual serial correlation tests confirm the 
fact that the errors are serially uncorrelated and the validity of the instrumental variables. 




Estimates using Arellano-Bond model 
 
 
      Dependent Variable: GDP growth ratet 
    Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
            
GDP growth rate t-1     0.547  0.534  0.557 
      (0.073)***  (0.088)***  (0.070)*** 
External Public Debt/GDPt     -0.143  -0.164  -0.172 
      (0.063)**  (0.060)***  (0.064)*** 
RERt    
- 
0.017  0.0005 
      (0.013)  (0.026) 
rt    
-  -  0.149 
      (0.241) 
Time Effect     YES  YES  YES 
              
         
Sargan Test (p-value)     1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
Serial Correlation order 1     0.0657  0.0697  0.0497 
Serial Correlation order 2     0.2734  0.2617  0.3000 
Observations     150  149  149 
Groups     5  5  5 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis     





  In this section, we simulate the sustainable primary balance and debt dynamics of 
a country that faces an initial real depreciation. The primary balance path is represented 
by equation (6) while the public debt path is represented by equation (9).  
Table 3 contains the parameters used in our simulation. From our empirical 
analysis in section 3, we assume a range of one to ten years for t , although we assume 
that for most of the cases is about three years. This means that in three years the country 
has to adjust to the desired long-term public debt ratio. In the lowest part of the range the 
country has to adjust within the first year to the desired long-term public debt ratio while 
in the upper part of the range, it will have ten years to return to that level. From our   15 
growth panel regression, we assume that the parameter that relates growth to debt is -
0.143 and the parameter that relates interest rate to debt is 0.167.  
We also assume that the country starts at a point where δt = δ*.   This is where the 
desired stock of this country’s public debt is equal to its actual stock.  For δ*, we assume 
a value of 0.35 based on recent literature that considers that the sustainable public debt-
to-GDP ratio in LDCs is in the range of 30% to 40%.
16  Note that for countries that have 
access to concessional debt, the relevant number is the present value of that debt rather 
than its face value. In our first simulation, we assume that 55% of that debt is 
denominated in foreign currency or indexed to the exchange rate.  In the countries 
considered in this paper, the average is around that figure, with Chile having the lowest 
(10%) and Peru the highest (80%). However, in the poorest countries, this fraction 
approaches 100%, which is why we performed a second set of simulations where 70% of 
public debt is denominated in foreign currency. 
  For both scenarios, the real GDP is assumed to grow at 4% per year when δt = δ*. 
As δt increases, GDP growth declines according to the parameter mentioned above. As 
shown in Edwards and Vergara (2001 and 2002), the GDP growth rate is critical for the 
sustainable path of the primary balance. As the primary focus of this paper is debt 
valuation issues, we do not simulate for different base rates of growth (this is the rate of 
growth when δ = δ*), although it is clear that as g* increases, the sustainable primary 
balance declines. Finally, the real interest rate on domestic public debt when δ = δ* is 
assumed to be 5%. This is consistent with a 2.5% international real interest rate plus a 
risk premium of 250 basis points.
 17 
  Seigniorage is assumed to be 0.4% of GDP, which is consistent with a monetary 
base of 6% of GDP, an inflation rate of 3% per year (hence a nominal GDP growth of 





                                                            
16 Edwards and Vergara (op. cit.), Edwards (op. cit.). 
17 Remember that we assume that  ) (
^
RER E = 0.   16 
Results 
  From our assumptions and using (6), we find that with no devaluation, the steady-
state primary balance consistent with fiscal sustainability for this theoretical country is a 
deficit of -0.05% of GDP.  
  Now we assume a real devaluation of 25% at the end of period zero. As we 
mentioned earlier, it is assumed that there are no further expected changes in the real 
exchange rate.
18 Table 4 shows the results of our simulations for different values of t and 
for 10 years after the devaluation occurs, when 55% of public debt is denominated in 
foreign currency. Panel A shows the primary balance sustainable path. If the country has 
three years to adjust to the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, it has to have a primary surplus 
of 1.11%, 0.94% and 0.61% in the first three years. This means a primary balance 
adjustment of between 1.16% to 0.66% of GDP per year for three years as compared to 
the non-devaluation situation. This is clearly not a minor adjustment for a country which 
was supposed to be fiscally sustainable. Panel B shows the path of public debt as a 
percentage of GDP. For the same t = 3, it goes up to 39.8% of GDP just after the 
devaluation. At the end of the first year, it is down to 38.2% of GDP and it is back to its 
equilibrium level (35%) at the end of period 3. Interest rates (panel C) go up to 5.82% at 
the end of year 1 and back to 5.0% in year 4.
19  Growth declines to 2.9% in the first year 
and returns to 4% after the fourth year. 
  If the country has to adjust in just one year, debt goes back to its initial level at the 
end of year 1. But the required adjustment in the primary balance in that year is 1.7% of 
GDP. 
In Table 5 we simulate the case when 70% of public debt is denominated in 
foreign currency. If the country has three years to return to the equilibrium debt-to-GDP 
ratio, it has to adjust its primary balance between 1.5% to 0.84% of GDP per year for 
                                                            
18 This is clearly a simplifying assumption since it can be expected that the fiscal adjustment would produce 
further changes in the exchange rate. Nonetheless, although the fiscal adjustment obtained in this exercise 
is large as compared to fiscal expenditure, it is relatively small as compared to the overall aggregate 
demand of the economy.  Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the further effec ts over the real exchange 
rate are rather small. 
19 Notice that neither growth nor the interest rate return to their previous levels immediately after  t years 
due to the presence of persistence in these variables.   17 
three years as compared to the non-devaluation situation. Public debt goes up to 41.1% of 
GDP just after the devaluation. At the end of the first year, it is down to 39.1% of GDP 
and it is back to its equilibrium level (35%) at the end of period 3. Interest rates (panel C) 
go up to 6.04% at the end of year 1 and back to 5.00% in year 4. Growth declines to 
2.56% in the first year and returns to 4% after the fourth year. 
  In a more extreme scenario, where the fraction of public debt denominated in 
foreign currency is 70% and the real devaluation is 50%, the average primary balance 
adjustment, when the adjustment period is three years, is 2.5% of GDP per year as 
compared to the non-devaluation situation. In this case, interest rates would jump to 7% 
and GDP growth would decline to 1.1%.   18 
Table 3 
Parameter Values Used in the Fiscal Sustainability Analysis 
           
Parameter  Symbol  Assumed Value  Comments and sources 
         
Desired (and initial)      Common figure used for  
external public debt  ʴ*  35%  sustainability analyses based  
to GDP ratio      on demand for public sector debt  
       (see Edwards and Vergara, 2002). 
         
Initial foreign currency       Fraction of public debt that is  
denominated debt as  (eoF0/D0)  55%-70%  in foreign currency. 
percentage of total debt       From the actual data of LA countries. 
           
Real interest rate when  r0  5.0%  It is assumed to be  
ʴ=ʴ*      equal to r*+ρ=r
FC 
         
Parameter that relates      GMM estimator 
interest rates in t  ʱ2  0.241   in autoregressive panel 
with interest rate in t-1       data model. 
(persistence)        
         
Parameter that relates      GMM estimator 
changes in interest rates  ʱ3  0.167   in autoregressive panel 
as debt changes       data model. 
           
Rate of real GDP      Simulation can be made  
 growth when  g0  4%  using different rates of growth. 
ʴ=ʴ*        
         
Parameter that relates      GMM estimator 
GDP growth rate in t  β2  0.547   in autoregressive panel 
with GDP growth rate in 
t-1       data model. 
         
Parameter that relates      GMM estimator 
changes in growth  β3  -0.143   in autoregressive panel 
as debt changes       data model. 
           
Time to come back to the        
desired public debt ratio 
 
  Between 1 and 10  According to impulse  
after the devaluation      response functions 
         
       Consistent with a monetary 
Seigniorage  S/Y  0.4%  base of 6% of GDP and a  
         nominal GDP growth of 7%. 




Real devaluation of 25% 
Initial foreign currency-denominated debt as a percentage of total debt: 55% 
 
Panel A    Panel B 
Primary balance    Public debt (% of GDP) 
      t               t      
Period  1  3  5  7  10    Period  1  3  5  7  10 
0  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05    0  39.81  39.81  39.81  39.81  39.81 
1  1.69  1.11  0.99  0.94  0.91    1  35.00  38.21  38.85  39.13  39.33 
2  0.02  0.94  0.96  0.97  0.98    2  35.00  36.60  37.89  38.44  38.85 
3  -0.04  0.61  0.76  0.83  0.88    3  35.00  35.00  36.93  37.75  38.37 
4  -0.05  -0.02  0.55  0.67  0.77    4  35.00  35.00  35.96  37.06  37.89 
5  -0.05  -0.05  0.35  0.52  0.66    5  35.00  35.00  35.00  36.38  37.41 
6  -0.05  -0.05  -0.03  0.37  0.55    6  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.69  36.93 
7  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.23  0.45    7  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.00  36.44 
8  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04  0.35    8  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.96 
9  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.25    9  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.48 
10  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.15    10  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.00  35.00 
 
 
Panel C    Panel D 
Real interest rate    Rate of real GDP growth 
      t               t      
Period  1  3  5  7  10    Period  1  3  5  7  10 
0  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00    0.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00 
1  5.34  5.82  5.91  5.95  5.98    1  3.37  2.87  2.77  2.72  2.69 
2  5.00  5.47  5.71  5.81  5.88    2  3.94  3.23  2.93  2.81  2.71 
3  5.00  5.12  5.49  5.65  5.78    3  3.99  3.72  3.23  3.01  2.85 
4  5.00  5.00  5.28  5.50  5.67    4  4.00  3.98  3.53  3.23  3.00 
5  5.00  5.00  5.07  5.35  5.56    5  4.00  4.00  3.83  3.45  3.16 
6  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.20  5.46    6  4.00  4.00  3.98  3.66  3.31 
7  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.05  5.35    7  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.88  3.46 
8  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.25    8  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.99  3.61 
9  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.14    9  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.76 
10  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.03    10  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.92 
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Table 5 
Real devaluation of 25% 




Panel A    Panel B 
Primary balance    Public debt (% of GDP) 
       t                 t       
Period  1  3  5  7  10     Period  1  3  5  7  10 
0  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05     0  41.1  41.1  41.1  41.1  41.1 
1  2.17  1.45  1.31  1.25  1.20     1  35.0  39.1  39.9  40.3  40.5 
2  0.04  1.23  1.26  1.28  1.30     2  35.0  37.0  38.7  39.4  39.9 
3  -0.04  0.79  0.99  1.09  1.16     3  35.0  35.0  37.5  38.5  39.3 
4  -0.05  -0.01  0.72  0.88  1.01     4  35.0  35.0  36.2  37.6  38.7 
5  -0.05  -0.05  0.46  0.68  0.87     5  35.0  35.0  35.0  36.8  38.1 
6  -0.05  -0.05  -0.03  0.49  0.73     6  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.9  37.5 
7  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.31  0.59     7  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.0  36.8 
8  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.03  0.46     8  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.0  36.2 
9  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.33     9  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.6 
10  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.20     10  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.0  35.0 
 
 
Panel C    Panel D 
Real interest rate    Rate of real GDP growth 
       t                 t       
Period           1            3            5            7          10      Period           1            3            5            7          10  
0  5  5  5  5  5     0  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00 
1  5.44  6.04  6.16  6.21  6.25     1  3.20  2.56  2.43  2.38  2.34 
2  5.00  5.60  5.90  6.03  6.12     2  3.93  3.02  2.64  2.48  2.36 
3  5.00  5.15  5.63  5.83  5.99     3  3.99  3.65  3.01  2.74  2.54 
4  5.00  5.00  5.36  5.64  5.85     4  4.00  3.97  3.40  3.02  2.73 
5  5.00  5.00  5.09  5.45  5.72     5  4.00  4.00  3.79  3.30  2.93 
6  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.26  5.58     6  4.00  4.00  3.98  3.57  3.12 
7  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.06  5.45     7  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.85  3.31 
8  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.31     8  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.99  3.51 
9  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.18     9  4.00  4.00  4.00  4.00  3.70 







  Ignoring valuation issues can lead to misleading conclusions regarding fiscal 
sustainability. We have shown that starting from a point where the country is in a 
sustainable fiscal position, a devaluation can dramatically change the path of primary 
balances consistent with current fiscal sustainability. Assuming that the country has three 
years to return to the equilibrium public debt-to-GDP ratio, the required primary balance 
adjustment after the devaluation is about 1% of GDP for each of those three years. The 
longer the adjustment period is, the smaller the adjustment. The larger the share of 
foreign currency-denominated debt, the greater the required fiscal adjustment while the 
greater the initial devaluation, the greater the fiscal adjustment. 
  This conclusion is important for poor countries that have a large share of public 
debt in foreign currency and frequently face terms of trade or other shocks that result in 
considerable depreciations of the domestic currency. With fiscal positions that usually are 
very tight, a required adjustment of the magnitudes found in this paper can be very 
stressful for these countries. 
  In this paper, we have assumed that the only factor affecting fiscal sustainability 
when there is a depreciation of the domestic currency is the change in the valuation of the 
public debt that is denominated in foreign currency. However, some developing countries 
have state-owned companies that produce commodities that are exported.
20 If this is the 
case, the devaluation also produces a positive revenue effect which works in the opposite 




                                                            
20 Even if the companies are not state-owned, there is an effect through tax revenues obtained from private 
companies producing and exporting commodities.   22 
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Impulse Response Functions 
Response of External Public Debt-to-GDP ratio to One S.D. RER Innovation 
 
Panel E: Peru 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 